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Abstract. We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation model that
yields large-scale small-world networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been
utilized to explain the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is natural to
seek for game-theoretic network formation models in which links are formed due to strate-
gic behaviors of individuals, rather than based on probabilities. Inspired by Even-Dar and
Kearns’ model [8], we consider a more realistic framework in which the cost of establishing
each link is dynamically determined during the course of the game. Moreover, players are
allowed to put transfer payments on the formation and maintenance of links. Also, they
must pay a maintenance cost to sustain their direct links during the game. We show that
there is a small diameter of at most 4 in the general set of equilibrium networks in our
model. We achieved an economic mechanism and its dynamic process for individuals which
firstly; unlike the earlier model, the outcomes of players’ interactions or the equilibrium
networks are guaranteed to exist. Furthermore, these networks coincide with the out-
come of pairwise Nash equilibrium in network formation. Secondly; it generates large-scale
networks that have a rational and strategic microfoundation and demonstrate the main
characterization of small degree of separation in real-life social networks. Furthermore, we
provide a network formation simulation that generates small-world networks.
Keywords: network formation, linking game with transfer payments, pairwise stability,
pairwise Nash equilibrium, small-world phenomenon
JEL classifications: D85, C79
1 Introduction
In recent years, networks have been extensively studied mostly in terms of their structure, but
also their formation and dynamics. Structural characteristics of various networks, which emerge
from disciplines, such as economics, computer science, sociology, biology and physics, have been
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citation:
Atabati, Omid, and Babak Farzad. A strategic model for network formation. Computational Social
Networks 2(1):1-14, 2015. DOI: 10.1186/s40649-014-0008-x
2 Omid Atabati and Babak Farzad
investigated. Many of these networks, in spite of their different origins, indicate large common-
alities among their key structural properties, such as small diameter, high clustering coefficient,
and heavy-tailed degree distribution which are often quantified by power-law probability distribu-
tions. Hence, it is an exciting challenge to study network formation models capable of explaining
how and why these structural commonalities both occur and evolve. The series of experiments
by Milgram in the 1960s [17] were among the pioneering works that quantified the small-world
phenomenon3 and introduced the “six degree of separation”. Recent experiments [6] showed that
today’s online social networks such as Facebook indicate that the degree of separation (for almost
any two individuals in a given database) must be even smaller than 4.
The small-world model by Watts and Strogatz [20] was one of the first models that generates
networks with small diameter. This work followed by Kleinberg’s stochastic model [16] that was
located in a grid graph. It introduced a process that adds links with distance d to the grid with
a probability proportional to 1/dα. These models, however, can not be applicable when there
is a strategical purpose in players’ making or losing their connections. In these cases, players,
which are represented by vertices, strategically establish and sever their connections to obtain
an advantageous position in their social network. Hence, we refer to a class of game-theoretic
network formation, also known as strategic network formation (See [7, 12] for comprehensive
surveys). Models in this class are in their early efforts. They generally assume that players make
connections based on a utility maximization and treat the network as the equilibrium result of
the strategic interactions among players.
1.1 Our contribution
Our game-theoretic network formation model is mainly inspired by Even-Dar and Kearns (EK
model) [8]. In their model, players (i.e., vertices) seek to minimize their collective distances to
all other players. The network formation starts from a seed grid. Also, the cost of establishing
each link in this model is considered to be the grid distance between the endpoint players of
that link to the power of α, which is the parameter of the model. Hence, their model uses a
fixed link-pricing for each link. Both link creation and link severance are considered unilateral by
players. In addition, the equilibrium is defined in terms of link stability : no players benefit from
altering a single link in their link decisions. The EK model achieves small diameter link stable
networks within the threshold of α = 2. However, they faced an unbounded diameter that grows
with the number of players, when α > 2.
We define three types of costs for links: (i) the link-price, (ii) the maintenance cost, and (iii)
the transfer payment. The link-price pij is the price of establishing link ij. Only the initiator
of connection would bear its payment. It is a one-time charge when establishing the link. We
introduce a new viewpoint to this game that better echoes with reality by constructing a dynamic
3 The principle that individuals are all linked by short chains of connections and acquaintances.
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link-pricing. When characterizing the formation of a network, the involved dynamics is a crucial
and determining element. We aim to effectuate the impact of this dynamics in our model with
the revised link-pricing. We update the used distances of each pair of players in the related
link-prices from the current network rather than sticking with the initial grid distances.
In addition, we introduce maintenance costs to make the model more real where a player
can give up her payment and sever her connection, if she’ll be better off by doing so. Also, it
is reasonable to assume that refunding the link-prices may not be possible in lots of real-world
scenarios. Hence, maintenance costs make the link severance scenario well-defined. In our model,
player i is charged for all of its incident links by considering recurring maintenance costs cij .
In other words, for each decision made in the game, players should take the maintenance cost
of their incident links into their consideration. Lastly, we allow individuals to put transfer or
side payments on their links. Transfers are a sort of communication between players for their
connections. In fact, without transfer payments, many agreements on these connections would
simply never exist.
We use the myopic notion of Pairwise Stability with direct and indirect transfers (PSt)4 as our
equilibrium notion. This notion has the advantage of being compatible with the cooperative and
bilateral nature of link formation. Moreover, the pairwise stability has the desirable simplicity
required for analyzing players’ behaviors under this notion.5
On the other hand, due to the bilateral agreement for any link formation, the typical notion
of Nash equilibria has some drawbacks in terms of coordination failures; e.g. an empty network is
always a Nash equilibrium. In other words, Nash equilibria networks can contain some mutually
beneficial link(s) that are left aside. To solve this coordination problem when employing Nash
equilibria, the notion of pairwise Nash stability6 was introduced. Pairwise Nash Stable (PNSt)
networks are at the intersection of the set of Nash equilibrium networks and the set of pairwise
stable networks.
In this paper, we not only guarantee the existence of pairwise stable networks, but also
demonstrate that, in our model, the set of pairwise stable networks coincide with the set of
pairwise Nash stable networks. Finally, we show that the general set of equilibrium networks
exhibits a short diameter of at most 4. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we explain the required preliminaries and provide the setup of our model. Section 3 contains
an analysis and extension to the EK model. We then provide the main results for our grid-based
4 The pairwise stability is the major notion of stability that assumes myopic players and has been
studied in related literature. In a linking game with transfers, it was first introduced as an extension
in [15] and then developed in [2, 3].
5 Computing the best responses of players in Nash equilibria within some similar models [18, 9] are
proved to be NP-hard.
6 See [4, 2, 3, 11].
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model with the dynamic link-pricing and transfer payments in Section 4. In Section 5, we present
the outcome of a network formation simulation that we carried out.
2 Preliminaries
The network and players. Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of n players forming a network G.
Network G is undirected and includes a list of pairs of players who are linked to each other.
Link ij ∈ G indicates that player i and player j are linked in G. Let GN denote the complete
network. The set G = {G ⊆ GN} consists of all possible networks on N . We define network G0
to be the starting network of the game, which is also called the seed network. The set of player i’s
neighbors in G is Ni(G) = {j|ij ∈ G}. Similarly, Li(G) = {ij ∈ G | j ∈ Ni(G)} denotes the set
of links, which are incident with player i in G. If l is a subset of Li(G), then G− l is the network
resulted by removing the existing links in the set l from G. Similarly, if l = {ij | j /∈ Ni(G), j 6= i},
then the network G+ l is obtained by adding the links in set l to G.
The utility of network G for player i is given by a function ui : G → R+. Let u denote
the vector of utility functions u = (u1, ..., un). So, u : G → RN . Also, the value of a network,
v(G), is the summation of all players’ utilities in the network G; i.e., v(G) =
∑n
i=1 ui(G). For
any network G and any subset li(G) ⊆ Li(G), the marginal utility for a player i and a set of
links li(G) is denoted by mui(G, li(G)) = ui(G)− ui(G− li(G)).
Strategies; transfer payments. Each player i ∈ N announces an action vector of transfer pay-
ment ti ∈ Rn(n−1)/2. The entries in this vector indicate the transfer payment that player i offers
(to pay) or demands (to gain) on the link jk. If i ∈ {j, k}, then we call it a direct transfer payment.
Otherwise, it is called an indirect transfer payment. Typically, individuals can make demands
(negative transfers) or offers (non-negative transfers) on their direct connections. However, they
can only make offers (and not demands) on the indirect transfer payments.7 In addition, a link jk




jk ≥ 0. Thus, the profile of strategies or the announced vectors of
transfer payments for all players is defined: t = (t1, ..., tn). Consequently, the network G, which
is formed by this profile of strategies t, can be denoted as follows:
G(t) = {jk |∑i∈N tijk ≥ 0, where j, k ∈ N}.
The payoff function. The distance between a pair of players i and j in G, denoted by dG(i, j),
is defined as the length of a shortest path between i and j in G. Similar to the EK model, players
seek to minimize their total distances to all players. This benefit would be considered for each
player with respect to the network G and links benefit both endpoints.8 The link-price is defined
7 This assumption is reasonable in our framework, since the formation of other links cannot hurt the
utility of non-involved players with respect to the distance-based structure of our utility function in
(1).
8 See e.g. [15, 3, 9] for some application instances of distance-based payoff structures.
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to be pij = dG(i, j)
α for α > 0. The link-price function is non-decreasing and follows Kleinberg’s
stochastic model. Also, function cij denotes the maintenance cost for the link ij. The utility















where Si is a subset of i’s neighbors whose links to i are initiated by i in the network formation.
The dynamic process. The following notion is stated from [13] that motivates the desired
dynamics for our analysis.
Definition 1 An improving path represents a sequence of changes from one network to another.
The changes can emerge when individuals create or sever a single link based on the improvement
in the resulting network relative to the current network.
In each round of the game, one player adapts her strategy with respect to the current state of
the network. We assume a random meeting mechanism for vertices (randomly choosing a pair of
players), but we start with a seed network instead of an empty network [19, 14]. If two networks
G and G′ differ in exactly one link, they are said to be adjacent networks. Also, if there exists
an improving path from G to G′, then G′ defeats G.
The equilibrium strategies. In every equilibrium profile of strategies t∗, there is no excess in
the offer of transfer payments. A transfer payment t∗iij is negative, if and only if maintaining the
existing link ij is not beneficial for i. In other words, i’s utility from network G is smaller that
her utility from network G − ij. We refer to this difference as a utility gap. Player i can only
use a transfer payment equal to her utility gap. Hence, for an equilibrium profile of strategies t∗ijk
that forms equilibrium network G,
G(t∗) = {jk |∑i∈N t∗ijk = 0, j, k ∈ N}.
We would like to indicate that other generalization of transfers’ distribution among players
are not among the main focuses of this paper.9
Definitions of equilibrium notions:
Definition 2 A network G is Pairwise Stable with transfers (PSt) with respect to a profile of
utility functions u and a profile of strategies t that creates network G if
(a) ij ∈ G =⇒ ui(G) ≥ ui(G− ij) as well as uj(G) ≥ uj(G− ij),
9 See [10, 1] for some instances of study in the case of bargaining between players on network. In fact,
despite the rich literature in general for bargaining between players, bargaining on networks is in its
early attempts.
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(b) ij /∈ G =⇒ ui(G) ≥ ui(G+ ij) as well as uj(G) ≥ uj(G+ ij).
Also, PSt(u) denotes the family of pairwise stable networks with transfers.
A pure strategy profile t∗ = (t∗1, ..., t∗n) forms a Nash equilibrium in the linking game with
transfers if ui(G(t
i, t∗−i)) ≤ ui(G(t∗)) holds for all i ∈ N and all ti ∈ Ti, where t∗−i is the
equilibrium strategy for all players other than i, and Ti is the set of all available strategies for i.
We can also indicate that in the context of network formation, a network G is Nash stable iff
∀i ∈ N , and ∀li(G) ⊆ Li(G): ui(G) ≥ ui(G− li(G)).
Definition 3 A pure strategy profile t∗ = (t∗1, ..., t∗n) forms a pairwise Nash equilibrium in the
linking game with transfers if
1. it is a Nash equilibrium, and














−ij)) ≥ uj(G(t∗)), and
(c) at least one of (1) or (2) holds strictly,
where t∗−ij includes all players’ strategies in t
∗ except player i.
Fig. 1. An example of a sub-network from network G during the dynamic process
A tutorial example. Suppose that Figure 1 shows a sub-network of a network G that is
obtained through an improving path. Also, assume that player i considers establishing a link to
player j in the next random meeting. Fur this example, let assume α = 2 and cij = 10 for all i
and j. Furthermore, Bi(G+ij, ij) = −
∑
k 6=i(dG+ij(i, k)−dG(i, k)) defines the benefit of reduced
distances in the whole network G that player i is received after adding link ij to G. We assume
that Bi(G+ ij, ij) = 30 and Bj(G+ ij, ij) = 5 in this example.
According to the dynamic link-pricing, pij = 3
2 = 9. First, we can verify that player i has an
incentive to buy link ij, as Bi(G + ij, ij) = 30 ≥ 9 + 10 = 19. However, there is no advantage
for player j in this linking, as Bj(G + ij, ij) = 5 < 10. Therefore, player j must demand the
transfer payment tjij = −5 that makes her indifferent regarding this linkage. Player i can offer
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the transfer payment tiij = 10 − 5 = 5 to player j, since creating ij is still beneficial for i, as
30 ≥ 5 + 19 = 24. Consequently, link ij can be added to G and network G′ is achieved along the
improving path of game. The network formation continues until a pairwise stable network with
transfers is reached. Note that we can also consider the indirect transfers that other players may
offer for this linkage, which is not stated in this example for simplicity.
3 Fixed link-pricing model
In this section, we study the EK model [8] and consider an extension to this model. This also
helps us to provide some insights regarding our results in Section 4.
3.1 The presence of cycles
The EK model takes a
√
n×√n grid as its seed network. It defines the link-price pij = dG0(i, j)α
for α > 0 and defines dG0(i, j) to be the grid distance of i and j. Consequently, the link prices
are fixed during the course of the game. Furthermore, this model defines the set si ∈ {0, 1}n−1
to be the action set of player i such that sij is one when player i creates a link to player j. Also,
each link benefits both endpoints and sij = 1 iff sji = 1. The utility function for player i ∈ N is
ui(G(s)) = −
∑
j 6=i dG0(i, j)−
∑
j∈Ni pij .
In the EK model, link creation is unilateral. Moreover, creation of a link only requires the
agreement of at least one of the endpoint players of the link. This is in contrast to our model
in which the presence of each link needs the consent of both players. Also, there is no transfer
payment and maintenance cost in this model. Players can receive a refund of the link-prices given
the severance of links. This model uses the notion of link stability, where link stable networks
are immune against unilateral creation or severance of a single link by each player.
A problem that can arise in this model concerns the fact that the network formation may not
converge to a link stable network. In other words, there exists the possibility for the formation
of cycles in the evolving networks during this network formation model, as it is defined in the
following.
Definition 4 A cycle C is a set of networks (G1, ..., Gk) such that for any pair of networks
Gi, Gj ∈ C, there exists an improving path connecting Gi to Gj. In addition, a cycle C is a
closed cycle, if for all networks G ∈ C, there does not exist an improving path leading to a
network G′ /∈ C.
Generally, the presence of negative externalities can be seen as one of the potential reasons in
the formation of cycles in linking games.
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Fig. 2. In this example, the game may not converge to a link stable graph.
Consider the following grid-based example shown in Figure 2. In this example, we can observe
the formation of a cycle in the game.
Assume that 48 < 3α < 49. First, it is easy to verify that player s has an incentive to
create link st. Now a cycle of strategical updates may be formed as follows. Player u saves 57 in∑n
i=1 dG(s)(u, vi) as it can be verified that the distance to u of 9 players in area i is reduced by 1
and the distance to u of 24 players in area ii is reduced by 2. So, (I) player u has an incentive to
buy link uv, as puv = dG0(u, v)
α = 3α < 9 + 48 = 57. Then with similar observations, it can be
seen that the following strategical changes will be made in this order. (II) player w buys link wu
as pwu = dG0(w, u)
α = 3α < 49. (III) player u is no longer willing to maintain link uv, as with
existing link wu, it has a benefit of only 48. Therefore, u returns the link uv. (IV) player w has
no incentive to retain link wu, as with the removal of link uv, it has a benefit of only 34. So, w
returns the link wu. Thus, a cycle of steps (I) to (IV) may be formed and the game does not
converge to stability. The example can be expanded to a large-scale grid as well. We note that
player w, by establishing wu, creates a negative externality for u. Since it causes a reduction in
player u’s utility, u decides to sever uv that in overall leads to the formation of a cycle.
3.2 Forbidding link severance
In this model, players should be allowed to sever only those links that they themselves have
purchased. However, this issue is not clear in the notion of link stability.10 Let assume an extension
of EK model with forbidding severing links. Forbidding players to sever their links, although
10 Adding a charging scheme for the maintenance of existing links is a reasonable extension that can
resolve this issue and it is studied in our model.
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limits the applicability of model, makes the convergence of equilibrium networks possible for the
network formation.
Proposition 1 Under the assumption of forbidding link severance in the EK model, the conver-
gence of network formation to link stability is guaranteed.
Proof. When there is no link severance, the existence of negative externalities for players is ruled
out. In other words, there is no player whose utility can be hurt during the game. Thus, the
total value of the network is increased by each change during the dynamic process. This points
to the exact pairwise monotonicity, introduced by Jackson and Watts [13], which guarantees the
existence of stable networks. The proof of Theorem 1 can be adapted to imply Proposition 1.
4 Dynamic link-pricing model with transfer payments
4.1 Existence of pairwise stable network with transfers
In all game-theoretic problems, one of the primary questions concerns the existence of equilibria
or stable states. This question in the framework of network formation is translated to the existence
of pairwise stable networks and have been first addressed by Jackson and Watts [13]. We show
that their arguments can be extended and adapted in our model. As a result, we guarantee the
existence of pairwise stable network with transfers in our model.
While improving paths that start from a seed network may end in an equilibrium network,
it is also possible to find the formation of cycles as the result of an improving path. Jackson and
Watts showed that in any network formation model there exists either a pairwise stable network
or a closed cycle. Their argument is based on the fact that a network is pairwise stable if and only
if it does not lie on an improving path to any other network. We provide the following lemma
and refer to the work of Jackson and Watts [13] for its proof, where the exact arguments can be
applied for the notion of PSt in our model.
Lemma 1 In the network formation model with transfer payments, there exists either an equi-
librium network from PSt(u) or a closed cycle of networks.
Theorem 1 In the linking game with direct and indirect transfers given the utility function in
(1),
(a) there are no cycles,
(b) there exists at least one pairwise stable network (PSt(u)).
Proof. We can rule out the existence of cycles in a network formation model if we show that
the following holds: for any two networks G and G′, G′ defeats G if and only if v(G′) > v(G)
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and G and G′ are adjacent.11 We can briefly argue that our linking game satisfies this condition.
Since the direct and indirect transfer payments between players prevent the situations, where
a player’s utility can get hurt by actions (link addition or deletion) of others. In fact, this is
one of the main function of transfers. Therefore, the value of networks through each improving
path must be increased. Conversely, if G and G′ are adjacent in an improving path such that
v(G′) > v(G), G′ must defeat G, where G is a network in the cycle.
Now, since there are finitely many networks that can be reached through the dynamic process,
if there is a cycle, then the exact pairwise monotonicity of our linking game implies v(G) > v(G);
contradiction. Ruling out the existence of cycles along with Lemma 1 guarantees the existence
of at least one pairwise stable network with transfer payments.
4.2 Strictly pairwise stability
Now, we show that given the utility function u(.) in (1), the family of networks in PSt(u) satisfies
the notion of strictly pairwise stability. It is first described by Chakrabarti and Gilles [5], which
is a variation of pairwise stability.
Definition 5 A network G is strictly pairwise stable for u, if
(a) ∀i ∈ N and ∀li(G) ⊆ Li(G), ui(G) ≥ ui(G− li(G),
(b) ∀i ∈ N , ij /∈ G implies ui(G+ ij) < ui(G) as well as uj(G+ ij) < uj(G).
In order to progress our argument, we need to provide the following definition and lemma.
Definition 6 Let α ≥ 0. A utility function u(.) is α-submodular in own current links on A ⊆ G
if ∀i ∈ N,G ∈ A, and li(G) ⊆ Li(G), it holds that
mui(G, li(G)) ≥ α
∑
ij∈li(G)mui(G, ij).
The case α = 1 corresponds to submodularity, also called superadditivity in [2].
Lemma 2 The utility defined in (1) is submodular in own current links.
Proof. The proof is inspired by the arguments in [10]. First, we show the related inequality in
Definition 6 holds for the case when the subset li(G) consists of two distinct links ij and ik,
which is indicated in the below inequality.
mui(G, ij + ik) ≥ mui(G, ij) +mui(G, ik) (2)
If we consider any player such as m in network G, the distance between i and m (dG(i,m))
contributes to the distance expenses in i’s utility. It is important to note that removing any link
11 This condition is denoted as exact pairwise monotonicity by Jackson and Watts.
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such as ij or ik from the network G cannot decrease this distance, however if the removed link
belongs to the shortest path between i and m in G, then the distance would be increased. This
argument can be extended to the severance of two links such as ij and ik from G.
dG(i,m) ≤ dG−ij(i,m) ≤ dG−ij−ik(i,m) (3)
dG(i,m) ≤ dG−ik(i,m) ≤ dG−ij−ik(i,m) (4)
In computing the marginal utilities of networks G − ik,G − ij, and G − ij − ik, we should
note that the link-prices of removed links cannot be refunded for player i.
mui(G, ij) = −
∑
m 6=i
(dG(i,m)− dG−ij(i,m))− cij − tiij (5)
mui(G, ik) = −
∑
m6=i
(dG(i,m)− dG−ik(i,m))− cik − tiik (6)
mui(G, ij + ik) = −
∑
m 6=i
(dG(i,m)− dG−ij−ik(i,m))− cij − cik − tiij − tiik (7)
According to Inequalities (3) and (4), we can simply imply the Inequality (2). Finally, we can
easily extend this argument for any subset of links li(G).
Proposition 2 Given the utility functions u(.) defined in (1), PSt(u) = P ?(u).
Proof. According to the definitions, it can be derived that P ?(u) ⊆ PSt(u). We further prove
that PSt(u) ⊆ P ?(u).
Let G ∈ PSt(u), then for any link ij /∈ G, neither player i nor j can benefit from creating
link ij. This is one of the impact of allowing players to put transfer payments on the links. Thus,
pairwise stable networks with transfers satisfy the second condition in the Definition 5. Further,
we know that ∀i ∈ N , and ∀j ∈ li(G), ui(G − ij) ≤ ui(G). Let assume there are k links in the
subset li(G). Hence,
∑
ij∈li(G) ui(G− ij) ≤ (k)ui(G). On the other hand, based on Lemma 2,∑




ui(G− ij) ≤ ui(G)− ui(G− li(G)). (8)
Since the left-hand side of Inequality (8) is positive, the expression in the right-hand side
must be positive too. So, this proves the first condition in the Definition 5 for the networks in
PSt(G).
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4.3 Convergence to pairwise Nash stability
Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ [4] show the equivalency of pairwise stable networks and pairwise
Nash stable networks, given a utility function that is α-submodular. It targets the simple obser-
vation that given a α-submodular utility function, if a player does not benefit from severing any
single link, then she does not benefit from cutting any subset of links simultaneously as well. A
similar argument can be adapted to our linking game with transfers as well. So, we provide the
following proposition without proof.
Proposition 3 Given a profile of utility functions u in (1) in a linking game with transfers,
PSt(u) = PNSt(u).
4.4 Small diameter in equilibrium networks
We take a large-scale
√
n × √n grid as the seed network in this model. In order to prove the
main result for the diameter of the equilibrium networks, we provide the following lemmas.
Let TG(t)(i, j) be the set of players that use link ij in their unique shortest paths to i in the
network G(t) : TG(t)(i, j) = {k ∈ N | dG′(t)(i, k) > dG(t)(i, k)}, where G′ = G− ij.
Lemma 3 Let G(t) be an equilibrium network and i, j ∈ N be an arbitrary pair of players in
this network. If ij /∈ G(t) then |TG(t)(i, j)|<
dG(t)(i, j)
α + cij + t
i
ij
dG(t)(i, j)− 1 .
Proof. Since i and j are not linked in the equilibrium network, the benefit of establishing ij has
to be less than its linking costs for i and j. On the other hand, TG(t)(i, j) represents the set of
players that creates a part of this benefit by reducing the distance dG(t)(i, j) between i and j to
1. Hence, we can state that paying dG(t)(i, j)
α + cij + t
i
ij , which is necessary for establishing ij,
cannot be beneficial for player i. As a result, |TG(t)(i, j)|(dG(t)(i, j)− 1) < dG(t)(i, j)α + cij + tiij .
Remark 1 For any i, j ∈ N , cji can be noted as an upper bound for the transfer payment tiij.
Hence, if c = max∀i,j∈N (cjk), it is an upper bound for any direct transfer payment in the network.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium network G(t), for any player i ∈ N ,
let Sdi = {k ∈ N | dG(t)(i, k) ≤ d}. Then, |Sdi |(1 +
dα + 2c
d− 1 ) ≥ n, where c = max∀i,j∈N (cij).
Proof. The set Sdi consists of players in the neighborhood of i within a distance at most d.
Furthermore, for each of these players such as k in the set Sdi , according to Lemma 3, we
consider the set TG(t)(i, k). All players outside of this set should use one of players such as k in
their shortest path to i. As a result, we can cover all players outside the set Sdi by allocating a
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set TG(t)(i, k) to i for all players in set S
d
i . By doing so, an upper bound of |TG(t)(i, k)||Sdi |+|Sdi |
for the number players in network (n) is achieved.
In order to obtain an upper bound for the set TG(t)(i, k) in wide range of different possible
choices for i and k, we define c to be the maximum maintenance cost for all possible links in
network. According to Remark 1, this is an upper bound for all the possible direct transfer
payments as well. Hence, |TG(t)(i, k)|≤ d
α + 2c
d− 1 . By substituting the upper bounds of TG(t)(i, k)
and Sdi in |TG(t)(i, k)||Sdi |+|Sdi |≥ n, the desired inequality can be achieved.
Lemma 5 shows an upper bound for the set |S2i |.






h1 + h2(g1 + 2) + h3(2f1 + f2 + 3)
))
, where ∆ is the
diameter of any equilibrium network G(t), and 0 ≤ k, fi, gi, hi ≤ 1 denote some fractions of
players in the set S2i based on their reduced distances to player i when forming the link ij. Also,
f1 + f2 + f3 = g1 + g2 = h1 + h2 + h3 = 1.
Proof. Let G be an arbitrary instance from the set of equilibrium networks in our model, which
are the set of pairwise stable networks with transfer (G ∈ PSt(u)), given the utility function
u(.) in (1). Also, let t be the the profile of strategies for players that forms G. Further, assume
that the largest distance between any two players (or diameter) in network G exists between two
players i and j. We denote ∆ to be the size this distance. Note that the pair of i and j is not
necessarily unique.
Based on the stable state, we can imply that creation ij is not beneficial for neither i nor
j. If j wants to establish a link to i, |S2i | is a lower bound for the j’s benefit that comes from
the reduced distances to players in S2i . This set includes i itself and two subsets of players that
are in distance 1 (type 1) and 2 (type 2) from i. First, let k represents players in S2i such that
their distances to j can be reduced by adding ij, as a fraction with respect to all players in |S2i |.
Moreover, let h1 represents player i itself as a fraction with respect to all players in |S2i |. By
establishing ij, j’s distance to i reduced by ∆− 1.
Furthermore, let h2 and h3 represent the fractions of the number of type 1 players and
type 2 players, respectively, in S2i . Their reduced distances for j is computed according to the
initial distances of these two types of players in S2i from j. Among the type 1 players, there
are two subsets of players that g1 and g2 are their fractions with distance of ∆− 1 and ∆ from
j, respectively. Furthermore, in type 2 players, there are three subsets of players in terms of
their distance from j with fractions of f1, f2, f3 that are in distance of ∆ − 2,∆ − 1,∆ from j,
respectively.
Theorem 2 For a sufficiently large network, there is a small diameter of at most 4 for any
equilibrium network in the dynamic link-pricing model with transfer payments.
14 Omid Atabati and Babak Farzad
Proof. Based on our arguments in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we can state that






h1 + h2(g1 + 2) + h3(2f1 + f2 + 3)
))
. (9)
For sufficiently large network, when the diameter is greater than bh1 + h2(g1 + 2) + h3(2f1 +
f2 + 3)c, it contradicts Inequality (9). Clearly we can specify that 3 ≤ 2f1 + f2 + 3 ≤ 5 and
2 ≤ g1 + 2 ≤ 3. Thus in this case, the upper bound for the diameter is the weighted average of 1,
2f1 + f2 + 3 and g1 + 2 and it is surely smaller than 5. Therefor, diameter cannot be bigger than
4 for any choice of parameters. However, we cannot have the same claim for smaller diameter
and rule out their possibility.
5 Simulations
We carried out a set of simulations that improves the EK model by implementing the dynamic
link-pricing and a fixed maintenance cost c. These simulations generate networks that show (i) a
small diameter of at most 4, (ii) a high clustering coefficient (with respect to edge density), and
(iii) a power-law degree distribution. The dynamical simulations are implemented on a grid with
n ≈ 1000. At each iteration of the dynamic process, two players i and j are chosen uniformly at
random. Then, with probability 1/2 player i considers establishing a link to j (if ij /∈ G) and with
probability 1/2 she considers severing her link to j (if ij ∈ G). Note that these considerations are
such that in each random meeting, the decision for adding (or removing) a link is implemented
based on the corresponded benefit and cost to that link with respect to the current state of the
evolved network. We used the notion of link stability. In this set of simulations, we aim to indicate
our improvements and extension on the EK model in order to generate small-world networks.
Note that by using the dynamic link-prices, the emergence of a small diameter of at most 4 in
link stable networks are directly implied similarly by our argument in Section 4.4.12
In many instances of our simulations, it can be seen as in Fugure 3 that the degree distribution
is a good estimation for the power-law degree distributions in the real-life social networks. Fig-
ures 3 shows the impact of parameters c and α on the degree distributions of resulting networks.
The larger plots are the distributions where their vertical axis is the probability for degrees and
their horizontal axis determines different values for the degree of nodes. The smaller plots are
the log-log plots of these distributions. Their vertical axis are the logarithm of the number or
the frequency for nodes with different values for their degree. Moreover, the appearance of few
high degree nodes represents the few hubs in these networks.
12 Note that although the existence of stable networks and convergence to the Nash outcomes would not
be guaranteed in this assumption, we achieved a set of link stable networks by implementing many
trials for different sets of α and c.
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Figure 4 demonstrates the clustered structure of the link stable networks: a high average
clustering coefficient is present in all instances after increasing the maintenance cost from c = 1.
The high clustering in these networks can be highlighted by pointing out their small edge-density
in the range from 0.007 for the network with c = 50, α = 5 to 0.069 for the network with c = 1
and α = 1. The diameter in all instances was either 3 or 4 as expected.
Fig. 3. Degree distributions. Structural properties of generated networks in the simulations.
Fig. 4. Average clustering coefficients Structural properties of generated networks in the simulations.
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